http://hervedarricau.github.io/website/Recent content on Hervé DarricauHugo -- 0.147.2enFri, 25 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000http://hervedarricau.github.io/website/research/paper1/Fri, 25 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000http://hervedarricau.github.io/website/research/paper1/This paper proposes a sufficient statistics approach to the political feasibility of fuel tax reforms and applies it empirically to the last attempted French reform.http://hervedarricau.github.io/website/location/Tue, 01 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000http://hervedarricau.github.io/website/location/<hr> <h4 id="mailing-address">Mailing address</h4> <h2 id="palaiseau-france">Hervé Darricau CREST, ENSAE Paris 5 Av. Le Chatelier, 91120 Palaiseau, France</h2> <h4 id="office-address">Office address</h4> <h2 id="palaiseau-franc">Room 4091 CREST 5 Av. Le Chatelier, 91120 Palaiseau, Franc</h2>http://hervedarricau.github.io/website/research/paper2/Sun, 01 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000http://hervedarricau.github.io/website/research/paper2/<!-- ##### Abstract: Do employers end up capturing in-work transfers by lowering wages, or does the benefit stay with workers? We study this question for the French *prime d'activité*, using the 2019 reform that raised the program's generosity. Newly linked administrative data identify both recipients and their employers, which lets us measure each firm's exposure as the pre-reform share of its workers receiving the transfer, and compare wage trajectories in highly and weakly exposed firms. Highly exposed firms saw transfers to their workers rise by an amount equivalent to about 1% of their wage bill. Yet we find only small, statistically insignificant wage reductions, including in low-skilled occupations, which are more likely to be exposed. The estimated pass-through to firms is 13% and not statistically significant, so the increase appears to have accrued to workers. This contrasts with earlier studies, which find that employers capture roughly 30% of similar transfers. We suggest two explanations: the transfer is claimed by workers rather than paid through the employer, and the program's complexity limits employers' ability to observe eligibility. **Key facts:** - Recipients represent 19% of the workforce, mostly low-wage workers in low-skilled occupations. - The program is equivalent to an implicit wage subsidy of about 11% of net earnings for recipients. - Exposure varies across sectors and regions. --- ##### Citation Bozio, Antoine, Hervé Darricau, Claire Leroy, Clément Malgouyres, Maxime Tô. 2026. "Incidence of In-Work Benefits: Evidence from France." Working paper, February. ```BibTeX @unpublished{BDLMT26, author = {Bozio, Antoine and Darricau, Hervé and Leroy, Claire and Malgouyres, Clément and Tô, Maxime}, title = {Incidence of In-Work Benefits: Evidence from France}, note = {Working paper}, year = {2026}, month = {February}} ``` -->http://hervedarricau.github.io/website/papers/effets-budgetaires-redistributifs/Mon, 30 Jun 2025 00:00:00 +0000http://hervedarricau.github.io/website/papers/effets-budgetaires-redistributifs/Effets budgétaires et redistributifs de mesures socio-fiscales pour la consolidation budgétaire : CDHR, hausse de TVA, gel des pensions et prestations.http://hervedarricau.github.io/website/officehours/Wed, 08 May 2024 00:00:00 +0000http://hervedarricau.github.io/website/officehours/Schedule and location for Professor Dr von Igelfeld&#39;s office hours.